Avicenna/Ibn Sina’s (d. 1037) Flying Man argument is one his contributions to philosophy best known in the western world. Avicenna, who replaced Aristotle in the eastern world as ‘the Philosopher’ could be seen as a precursor to the French polymath Descartes (1596-1650) in some aspects. The similarity between Descartes’ cogito and the Flying Man is striking, though the context for and the purpose of these thought experiments are quite different. But what is the purpose of Avicenna’s Flying Man argument? Why does Avicenna need to describe the Flying Man as floating in the air, with his limbs spread? What is the Flying Man aware of and what he is not aware of? What does Avicenna conclude from this? And, is the Flying Man argument convincing?
Avicenna’s Flying Man thought experiment is proposed to argue that the human soul is incorporeal. Avicenna describes the Flying Man as floating in the mid-air, without any support, with his limbs spread apart. He is unable to touch any object, including his own limbs, neither can he see, smell, hear or taste anything (Remarks and Admonitions, Chapter 1) Thus, the Flying Man deprived all his five senses due to his position. This is significant to the argument as any knowledge or affirmation attained in this manner is not empirical, i.e., not owed to sense experience.
Avicenna argues that the Flying Man would not be aware of his own body, his own external or internal organs. Yet, ‘he has no doubt in his affirmation his essence (dhat) is existent’ (Remarks and Admonitions, Chapter 3). Thus, the Flying Man can affirm his existence, the existence of the subject ‘I’ or the ‘self’ (identical to the essence of the soul) without any sensory experience either of his own body or the external world. The fact that the Flying Man can recognise this ‘self’ without any sense data designates a conceptual distinction between the ‘self’ and the ‘body’. The Flying Man knows his self/essence without knowing that he has a body. Avicenna further posits that this conceptual distinction indicates a real distinction between the ‘self’ and the body, as ‘what is affirmed is distinct from what is not affirmed’ (Remarks and Admonitions, Chapter 3). From this line of argument, Avicenna concludes that the soul is something distinct from the body. In other words, the human soul is incorporeal.
Another conclusion implicit from Avicenna’s line of argument is that there is at least some form of knowledge that is not dependent on sensory experience. If the Flying Man can reliably conclude that ‘his essence is existent’ (Remarks and Admonitions, Chapter 3) without any sense perception, it proves that humans can attain some knowledge without any sense data. This would be a challenge to empiricism, the epistemological position that holds all human knowledge is derived from sense experience.
However, Avicenna’s leap from a conceptual distinction to a real distinction between the self/essence and the body is highly problematic. It is true that the Flying Man concludes about his self without any knowledge of his body, but this doesn’t mean that he in fact doesn’t have a body. His conclusion could as well be inadvertently about his body.
One can defend Avicenna’s position by interpreting the thought experiment as a conceivability test. In this view, Avicenna uses this test to distinguish between the essences and accidents of a being. In the Flying Man argument, Avicenna shows that the body, its limbs, and organs are not part of what humans conceive as their ‘selves’. These are accidental attributes of being human, conceivably distinct from its essence which is the self/soul. Unlike the body, this essence is incorporeal. This interpretation of the argument is more convincing as it avoids the leap from a conceptual distinction to a real distinction.
rana the reader 